National Forests) 50 -all before Utah was invited to become a state. Such an evolutionary public land policy makes sense in a constantly changing nation. Growing urbanization, an expanding population, and a finite land base have demanded continued evolution in federal land policy.
More recently, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) unified 3,000 separate and often conflicting public land laws into a coherent package. 51 FLPMA expressly requires that "the public lands be retained in Federal ownership, unless . . . it is determined that disposal of a particular parcel will serve the national interest." 52 Yet even under a policy favoring retention, the BLM managed to dispose of over 24 million acres of land between 1990 and 2010. 53 In sum, it was early federal policy to dispose of public lands, the federal government did dispose of millions of acres of public land, and it attempted to dispose of many more. Much of the land sought by Utah and its neighbors was open to settlement but bypassed in favor of greener pastures. The federal decisions to retain land in federal ownership, many predating establishment of Western states, are clearly within the federal government's constitutional authority and not contrary to state enabling acts.
The Disclaimer Clauses. The enabling acts for all Western states contain similar language and pose a formidable barrier to transfer demands. Section III of the Utah Enabling Act states:
That the people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof; and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United States. 54
This "forever" disclaimer was incorporated into, and remains part of, the Utah Constitution. 55 Furthermore, section XII of the Utah Enabling Act states that, "Utah shall not be entitled to any further or other grants of land for any purpose than as expressly provided in this Act." 56 These disclaimer provisions are unambiguous and, as a matter of statutory construction, provide a clear measure of congressional intent.
Transfer proponents attempt to get around these disclaimers by contending that under section III, the federal government was obligated to "extinguish" title to additional lands, and that state disclaimers of rights to additional land are inoperative because the federal government failed to meet its extinguishment obligations. Traditional rules of statutory construction highlight four critical failings with this argument.
First, assuming that section III requires the federal government to extinguish title to unappropriated public lands, the provision does not require the federal government to extinguish title to all such lands. "Extinguish," if read as referring to the immediately preceding language, applies to "all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes." 57 "Extinguish," if read to refer back to the first clause, as TPLA backers prefer, applies to "the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof." 58 "All" is notably absent from the clause the TPLA's backers rely upon. Congress could have made the extinguishment language applicable to all unappropriated public lands just as it made the state's disclaimer of title to Indian lands applicable to "all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes." But Congress chose not to do so. According to the Supreme Court, courts "do not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply, and our reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to make such a requirement manifest." 59 Transfer proponents' interpretation cannot stand because it would defeat congressional intent.
Second, even if Transfer advocates can get around the section III disclaimer, they run headlong into section XII's prohibition against land grants not "expressly provided for" in the act. The right to title to additional public land is not "expressly provided for," and is therefore in conflict with congressional intent. Furthermore, Transfer advocates' broad reading of section III risks making section XII superfluous, violating another cardinal rule of statutory construction. 60 Third, even if the federal government is obligated to dispose of public lands, that obligation does not require the federal government to give land to the states. Section XII of the Utah Enabling Act states that, "Utah shall not be entitled to any further or other grants of land for any purpose than as expressly provided in this Act." 61 Text obligating the federal government to convey away lands is "strictly construed against the grantee." 62 To the extent that the Utah Enabling Act is ambiguous, that ambiguity should be construed in the federal government's favor. Congress should be held to retain discretion over the manner of disposal, and a strong case can be made that disposal should generate value for the American people. Identical provisions are found in the enabling acts for most Western states admitted during the same period. 63 If additional disposal is required, states may need to pay for the additional land, or lands may need to be conveyed to non-state entities.
Finally, the obligation to "extinguish" title refers to title to Indian lands, not to public lands. Following the Civil War, federal Indian policy favored land disposal. "There was no place left to remove the Indian, and there was little sympathy for the preservation of a way of life that left farmlands unturned, coal unmined, and timber uncut. Policymakers had determined that the old hunter way and new industrial way could not coexist." 64 Under the General Allotment Act of 1887 (the Dawes Act), tribal members surrendered their shared interest in tribal reservations in return for individually owned land. 65 Upon allotment approval, the Secretary of the Interior issued patents to the Indian allottees, and these patents were held in trust for individual Indians. 66 Upon conclusion of the trust period, title to individual allotments was conveyed to individual Indian allottees. 67 Additional lands were held in common by the tribe; the remaining lands were declared "surplus," 68 and made available for non-Indian settlement. 69 Allotment was an effective tool in extinguishing Indian land claims. "In 1887, when the Dawes Act provided for allotting tribal lands to individual Indians, the American Indian's heritage in land totaled 138 million acres. Less than 50 years later, when the allotment policy was abandoned, only 48 million acres were left in Indian hands." 70 Notably, the Dawes Act became law in 1887. None of the pre-1887 statehood enabling acts refer to "extinguishing" title to lands. However, the enabling acts authorizing admission of the next eight states, including Utah, all contain the extinguishment provision. 71 Reading the Enabling Act and Utah Constitution's "extinguishment" requirements as referring to Indian lands comports with congressional policy and Utah history. Prior to white settlement in 1847, Utah was home to five major Indian tribes, of which the Utes controlled the greatest expanse of territory. 72 From the Ute's initial reservation, 1,010,000 acres were added to the Uintah Forest Reserve (now the Uinta National Forest), 1,004,285 acres were opened to homestead entry, and thousands of acres were set aside for other purposes. 73 It is a well-established legal principle that statutes should be construed to affect congressional intent. 74 Thus "extinguish" should be read to refer to Indian land, not to ownership of public lands.
Federal Discretion to Sell Land.
Transfer advocates next argue that "shall" in the Enabling Act's ninth section obligates the federal government to dispose of federal public lands. Section IX reads:
That five per centum of the proceeds of the sale of public lands lying within said State, which shall be sold by the United States subsequent to admission of said State into the Union . . . shall be paid to the said State, to be used as a permanent fund. 75 Transfer advocates contend that "shall" is a term of obligation, 76 relieving the federal government of discretion to retain public lands. While "shall" is normally understood to be a term of obligation, 77 important exceptions exist. "Shall," may also be "[u]sed before a verb in the infinitive to show . . . something that will take place or exist in the future." 78 For example, "we shall arrive tomorrow." This interpretation was recognized by legal scholars at the time of Utah's admission to the Union and is reflected in legal dictionaries then in use. 79 Just as a will that included testamentary gifts to children that "shall be borne" creates a potential class of beneficiaries but does not obligate future births, "shall" in an enabling act indicates that at some future date, the federal government may sell public lands. If the federal government does sell more land, five-percent of the proceeds would go to the state, but the Utah Enabling Act does not obligate the federal government to dispose of public lands. Moreover, even if shall is interpreted as a term of obligation, at the turn of the 19th century, "shall" meant "[m]ay, when used against a government; and must, when used under other circumstances." 80 The meaning attached to statutory terms at the time of their enactment controls, not the meaning some apply more than a century later. 81 Moreover, the federal policy of retaining lands in federal ownership was firmly established well before Utah was offered statehood. For example, the federal government reserved mineral resources as early as 1785, 82 as lands for Indian reservations since at least 1789, 83 and for National Parks and National Forests as already discussed -policies that the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed. 84 The states clearly knew that not all public lands would be given to them, and arguing that "shall" obligates more sales ignores this reality.
The Equal Footing Doctrine. Transfer supporters often refer to the equal footing doctrine as evidence of Western states' right to title to federal public lands. 85 The equal footing doctrine holds that "all states are admitted to the Union with the same attributes of sovereignty (i.e., on an equal footing) as the original 13 states." 86 The Utah Enabling Act, like the enabling acts of other Western states, guaranteed that Utah would be admitted on an equal footing with the existing states. 87 The doctrine traces its roots to the 1845 Pollard v. Hagan decision, 88 which involved competing claims to title to submerged lands, one originating with the state and the other from the federal government. Georgia, as one of the original thirteen states, obtained title to land via the Revolutionary War 89 and then conveyed title to its westernmost frontier, including the lands at issue, to the federal government. This conveyance required that the land be held in trust for newly created states. The federal government subsequently issued Mr. Pollard title to the submerged land at issue. Mr. Hagan contended that his title, which came from the State of Alabama, was superior. The Supreme Court held that since the original states held title to submerged lands as an attribute of sovereignty, and new states were admitted on par with the original states, Alabama received title to the submerged lands and the federal government had no interest to grant to Mr. Pollard. 90 However, the equal footing doctrine does not apply to dry land 91 or require an equal distribution of land to each state, as the 1996 case of United States v. Gardner 92 makes clear.
In Gardner, the United States issued a permit to the Gardners to graze cattle on National Forest System lands. The Forest Service suspended the permit following a wildfire, providing time for vegetation to regrow. The Gardners resumed grazing prematurely, and the United States sued for damages to the range and to enjoin further grazing. The Gardners defended by challenging the federal government's title to the land, contending that after receiving the land from Mexico via the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, "the United States was entitled to hold the land in trust for the creation of future states, and was not authorized to retain the land for its own purposes." 93 The Gardners also argued that under the equal footing doctrine, "a new state must possess the same powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction as did the original thirteen states upon admission to the Union . . . [so] Nevada must have 'paramount title and eminent domain of all lands within its boundaries' to satisfy the Equal Footing Doctrine." 94 The court found the Gardners' arguments unavailing, holding that the "United States . . . was not required to hold the public lands in Nevada in trust for the establishment of future states. Rather, under the Property Clause, the United States can administer its federal lands any way it chooses, including the establishment of national forest reserves." 95 The Pollard doctrine applies only to submerged lands, not to the public lands acquired by treaty. 96 The court also noted that the equal footing doctrine "applies to political rights and sovereignty, not the economic characteristics of the states." 97 The doctrine is not intended to "eradicate all diversity among states but rather to establish equality among the states with regards to political standing and sovereignty." 98 The equal footing doctrine therefore does not require uniform disposal of federally owned lands. Rather, it guarantees that each state will have equivalent political rights. Retention of public lands in federal ownership is consistent with the equal footing doctrine, and as Gardner makes clear, the doctrine provides no tangible support for the Transfer Movement.
Conclusion.
Utah's legal claims to federal land grow out of its statehood enabling act. Since similar statutory language is found throughout the Western states, a successful claim by Utah could fuel more claims and potentially end the public land system as we know it. Utah's claims, like those of its neighbors, are doomed to failure, however. The federal government has absolute control over federal public lands, including the constitutional authority to retain lands in federal ownership. Statutes authorizing Western states to join the Union required those same states to disclaim the right to additional lands and that disclaimer cannot be spun into a federal duty to dispose. Statehood enabling acts' guarantee of equal political rights also cannot be spun into a promise of equal land ownership. Furthermore, though statehood enabling acts guarantee states a share of the proceeds resulting from federal land sales, that guarantee is not an obligation to sell.
As a BLM spokeswoman recently said with respect to confrontations over public land management and Utah's antagonistic tone towards the federal government: "It is frustrating as we work to identify the best possible path forward for everyone when some of the entities we are trying to work with consistently feel the need to poke us in the eye and then complain we are not working with them." 99 This may be the larger lessonthat the Transfer Movement does more harm than good to the federal-state relationship needed for effective public land management. (1922) ("It is firmly settled that Congress may prescribe rules respecting the use of the public lands. It may sanction some uses and prohibit others, and may forbid interference with such as are sanctioned."). 21 See e.g., UTAH CONST. art I, § 3. 22 Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 99 (1872) (upholding claim to land by a federal patent holder against a competing claim reliant on state law). 23 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 336 (1936) (holding that where the United States holds title to a hydroelectric dam, rights to the water passing through the dam, and all features incident to power generation, the electricity produced "constitutes property belonging to the United States," and the Property Clause does not constrain Congress's power to determine the terms of property dispossession). 24 
